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

COMMON FISHERIES POLICY: THE LIMITS OF "PRIVATIZATION"

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ABSTRACT

Within the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the fishing rights are regulated through national licenses and catch quotas. The management of these rights are the competence of individual member states and varies from member to member. The principle of Relative Stability, which guides the allocation of fishing possibilities, is an exemption from the internal market that is embedded in the CFP. Although the introduction of individual transferable quotas tends to increase concentration of fishing rights in fewer hands, it would increase economic efficiency. The issue of introducing a more liberal property rights trade system will have to confront the distributional effects of such a *coasian* proposal.

Keywords: Common Fisheries Policy, Rights Based Management, Stability Principle, Quota-Hopping, Individual Transferable Quotas.

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RESUMO

Política Comum de Pescas: Os limites da "privatização". O "Princípio da Estabilidade Relativa" enforma a Politica Comum de Pescas A distribuição e regulação dos direitos de pesca entre Estados membros através de TACs (totais autorizados de captura) e Quotas Não-Transferíveis permite uma territorialização desta política e garante o "balanço" entre a eficiência económica na utilização dos recursos biológicos, a longo prazo, e o equilíbrio social nas zonas costeiras e fortemente dependentes da pesca, no curto prazo. A introdução de um sistema liberal/*coasiano* de Quotas Individuais Transferíveis (ITQs) pode trazer alguma eficiência económica às pescas europeias mas terá de se confrontar com as questões da equidade na distribuição dos rendimentos e com os problemas decorrentes da concentração de propriedade.

Palavras-Chave: Política Comum de Pescas, Princípio da Estabilidade Relativa, Gestão pelos Direitos de Propriedade, "Quota-Hopping", Quotas Individuais Transferíveis.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The widespread implementation of rights based management (RBM) schemes in fisheries management, as ITQs (Individual Transferable Quotas), increased the opportunity for private sector groups to influence fisheries management. This development fostered a debate over the extent to which this private influence should be encouraged. In this context, some "liberal oriented policies" are put under inquisition: Clark, Munro & Sumaila (2010) defended that there are limits to the privatization of fisheries and there are situations in which the communities should not assign the defense of the common interest to the private sector.

The current evaluation of European fisheries is very clear: although it shows some interesting results, the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has not delivered the sustainable use of fish resources. Since the 2013 reform of the CFP, the European Commission has launched a wide, no-hold-barred consultation to the national administrations, stakeholders, researchers and other interested parts. The objectives are to discuss the

problems of the CFP and to explore the alternatives and the ways forward the reform of fisheries policy (European Commission 2009, 2009b, 2009c, 2011)

In recent years, there is a greater focus on ITQs and other Rights Based Management regimes as an approach that will encourage more efficient use in fisheries by the allocation of private property rights. The principle of "Relative Stability" shapes the Common Fisheries Policy. CFP was, traditionally, based upon TACs (Total authorized capture levels) and non-transferable quotas. One possibility for fisheries policy reform that is in permanent discussion is, precisely, the introduction of ITQs and other similar schemes (COM(2011) 417 final, COM(2009) 163 final).

Our paper is a modest contribution to this debate and investigates the feasibility of introducing these new management regimes in the CFP. Our fundamental issues are if and how can we deal with the problems of conflicting objectives in the fisheries policy and what will be the impacts of such a policy in terms of European cohesion.

2. E.U. FISHERIES CURRENT SITUATION

Since the early 80s, when "Blue Europe" was settled, more than three decades have passed and the Common Fisheries Policy is confronted with major challenges (Coelho, 2016; 1999). Two fundamental causes explain the current state of European fisheries: internal systemic weakness of the management and conservation regime and external challenges. CFP has not delivered sustainable exploitation of the resources. Conservation policy failed and many stocks are outside safe biological limits. If current trends subsist, many stocks will collapse. They have been exploited heavily as well, particularly the demersal fish stocks (Coelho et al., 2016; Martins, Coelho & Filipe, 2008). At the same time, fishing capacity was not limited as it was pretended and necessary. Illegal fishing and the lack of effective enforcement are also the root of this situation (Coelho et al., 2015b, 2008).

This picture is not specific to the Community. In fact, worldwide concern about over- fishing and overcapacity in the fisheries sector is well documented. The economic

fragility of the sector, reflected in poor profitability and declining employment, is the result of a special conjunction of over-investment, rising costs and diminishing resource stocks. And, at the political level, the difficulties associated with the design and implementation of such a regulatory system are substantial: social constraints, diversity of socio-economic structural conditions of the fisheries sector in the member states, lack of involvement of the stakeholders in the management policy. In the beginning of this decade, the Pew Environment Group commissioned a study (see the Report of Poseidon Aquatic Management Ltd, 2010) assessing the economic, environmental and social impacts of the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance, from 2000 to 2006. The study found that E. U. fisheries had failed to reduce fleet capacity thus exerting fishing pressure on stocks at two or three time sustainable levels. The key objective of the structural policy, that was to bring the fishing capacity of the European fleet into the line with the available biological resources, was not attended. Overcapacity and overcapitalization of the sector was identified as the principal failure of the CFP. The study highlights that member-states failed to consider environmental and social concerns when allocating public funding.

There are, also, external challenges affecting the healthy development of European fisheries: the enlargement of European Union and the globalisation of the economy, the emergence of new players in world fisheries (especially coastal developing countries) and the increased focus on the environment. In the international scene, the CFP is confronted with a "creeping jurisdiction" process: the slowly slide to the coastal countries' jurisdiction of many resources which were usually "common-property". After the relative calm that succeeds the approval of the new Law of the Sea (1982), conflicts and tension increased in the 90s. The enlargement created more difficulties getting commitments between a larger numbers of players in the game (Coelho et al., 2018, 2011b; Coelho, 2015).

As the Commission has been reminding, this is not entirely negative. CFP had positive results. It has managed the resources and contained conflicts at sea, provided some degree of stocks stability, avoided the total collapse of stocks in areas with greater

fisheries pressure and assured supply to the Europeans. However, according to the Commission, these results have been achieved at a high price in terms of the long-term viability of the sector and with inefficiencies in the allocation of resources that, perhaps, could have been more profitable if they were addicted to other sectors in the global European economy.

The critical problem is that the fleet profitability is jeopardised by the under-utilisation of investments. The excess capacity and a more-or-less constant value of landings to be shared between large numbers of actors, reduces the capacity of each vessel to earn an adequate income. In this context, the subsidy policy, artificially reducing the costs and risks of investment, in an already over-capitalised industry, promoted over-supply of capital. Those conclusions may be well important in the continuous process of CFP reform and put again the discussion about the tools that can be used to get sustainable management and better cohesion of fisheries policy (Coelho et al., 2015, 2012).

3. THE "BLUE EUROPE" DESIGN

The Management and Conservation Regime of fisheries in the European Union is, to a high degree, the result of an historic process with multiple compromises among national devices and political interests (Wise, 1984; Holden & Garrod, 1994). Nevertheless, it could be an error to look at the CFP only as a simple, empirical result of a day-to-day experience. Therefore, understanding the current difficulties is not possible without paying attention to the philosophy of intervention underlined in the options of 1983, when "Blue Europe" was settled. The analysis of some basic documents and initial proposals of the Commission, in the 70s, allows identifying the philosophy and theoretical purposes that, implicitly or explicitly, were subjacent to the definition of the common fisheries management regime (Coelho, 1989).

Since the beginning, two basic alternatives for the formulation of a fisheries policy were to be considered. On the one hand, a liberal policy that should only establish

competition rules in a common market; on the other, a policy of effective intervention, administered at a superior level, which could manage the resources in a perspective of equilibrium between the dynamic, biological conditions of fish growth and the economic conditions of resource use.

The Commission's preference for the second alternative was very clear. According to the Commission, the necessity of a "comprehensive" fisheries policy was obvious. This choice rested upon the presupposition that free access (that was central in the Treaty of Rome) would lead to the overexploitation of the resources. Furthermore, this conviction was explicitly made: "The straightforward implementation of the principle of equal access is bound to result in the rapid exhaustion of resources; the consequences of such a situation would be unacceptable" (SEC (1975) 4503 final, p. 9; see Coelho, 1989). Of course, that was a real problem for the Commission. Having the responsibility to assure the principles of the Treaty, it was out of discussion the opposition to the "equal access" principle. However, the fear of "fishing race" and "overfishing" problems justified an intervention policy that could regulate the activity in the sector and obviate the perverse effects of free access.

For such a policy to be feasible it needed a central authority. That involved a supranational management of resources - allowing free arbitration of the sector development by national states could lead to discriminatory action and poor enforcement and control. We can also understand the purpose of the designed Common Structural Policy. This policy could help the poorest (and most dependent on fisheries) coastal areas in Europe and could fund the modernization of the obsolete fleets of some member states. In this sense, the so-called "fisheries fund" (Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance) – in the beginning only a tiny part of agricultural fund (FEOGA-Garantia as it was named in Portugal) - was one of the fundamental elements of a real policy of inclusion and cohesion in Europe, in what concerned the fisheries.

The philosophy of intervention was settled. Then, the discussion turned into the management tools (Coelho, 1989). The choice was on command and control instruments (direct, non-economic instruments). The control of catches and selectivity in fisheries,

with the establishment of TACs and quotas, and technical measures of conservation (closed seasons, closed areas, minimum dimensions of fish caught and so on) were the preferred forms of regulation. The motives of this option were based on several reasons that included an implicit evaluation of the advantages of this kind of controls vis-à-vis other regulation alternatives, namely, those usually designed as indirect-economic tools, like taxes or ITQs (Individual Transferable Quotas).

At least five fundamental reasons made the justification of that choice. First, the Commission recognized that a common policy had costs and generated a lot of administrative problems. In this sense, the advantages of direct controls were clear. The design and control of these tools were simpler. The necessary biological information existed: the Community could count on the experience of organizations like CIEM, NEAFC or NAFO. On the other hand, the implementation of the regulation was a task that the Commission could not develop without the collaboration of the national administration services. The diversity of those, in structure and efficiency, implied the existence of a simple and clear regulation, of unquestionable scientific hardness, as a pre-condition for an effective implementation. Of course, a policy based on economic tools should bring problems almost insurmountable: exigency in information, high transaction costs in the preparation and negotiation of regulation, doubtful capacity of execution of some of member states administrative staffs.

Second, the political constraint. Despite its complexity, this issue can be put in a simple manner. For example: difficulties in tax harmonisation in EU are well known; taxation is a sensible question, it is seen as a domain of national sovereignty and all concessions in this field are problematic. So, taxes and other economic tools, which are very demanding in political negotiations, were simply abandoned. We know that the defense of what is defined by politicians and lobbies as the "national interest" (and the results they reach in negotiations), is the way to win elections and maintain jobs. In this context, command and control instruments are less exigent and facilitate the compromises. Even, they are preferred by fishermen and vessel owners because they are easy to understand in their fundaments and practical exigencies. That is also an

important advantage for the administration because it facilitates the dialogue with agents and the implementation of regulations.

Third, the problem of control and enforcement. The Commission has always given this question a central role in the Common Policy. Reasons are obvious. The Commission put the problem in terms of ethics: "It is the only way to assure that the sacrifices of some member states in the recovery of the stocks are not in vain because of the irresponsible action of others". Once again, direct controls had advantages: enforcement was easier with simple regulation that agents could understand, less costly in administrative terms, and, if there existed effective means of inspection and detention, evasion was minimized.

Fourth, the Commission's preoccupation with uncertainty in stock evolution and environmental and economic changes, justified the need for flexible tools. The possible necessity of urgent actuation in situations of environmental crisis, give the direct-control tools a strong advantage, because they are easier to manage and modify. For example, it is easier to establish a new closed area than to get involved in the definition and execution of a new system of individual transferable quotas.

Finally, and that is the central point in our opinion, the Commission emphasised the objective of minimising the social costs of the fisheries policy. In an original proposal of September 76 (COM (76) 500 final), the Commission explicitly expressed the preoccupation with social inclusion in the fisheries sector and with the European cohesion. In the opinion of the commissioners, the management regime should assure "an equitable distribution of the limited resources between the member-states", and "maintain, as far as is possible, the level of employment and income in the coastal zones and in the areas mostly dependent on fisheries". The European Parliament made pressure in this way, too, stating that the biological basis on which conservation and management regime should rest upon, could not be more than a starting point and, at least in the short term, the guarantees of employment and social inclusion were irreplaceable objectives. It is true that direct controls cannot avoid the sacrifices of fishermen, unemployment and social tension.

However, the reaction to other management tools that result in the abandonment of the less efficient producers could be worst. Facing these constraints, the answer was very clear: A system of TACs and quotas was a simpler solution for the problems of equitable distribution of fishing opportunities, depending only on the distribution formula of quotas between member-states. This formula of definition and allocation of use rights in European fisheries is dependent upon several factors like the dependency on fisheries of some coastal areas, level of employment and the redistribution of quotas by means of minimising the effects of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction on distant water fisheries. This is the so-called Principle of Relative Stability that shapes the Common Fisheries Policy. It can be seen as a means of establishing a balance between the promotion of economic efficiency, in the long run, and the necessary social-economic equilibrium in the coastal areas, in the short run (Coelho et al. 2007a).

4. INSIGHTS FROM "QUOTA HOPPING"

Besides the "balanced" fundaments of CFP, this economic and juridical construction did not obviate the results we highlighted. As we said, the choice of command and control tools for the regime – designed in 1983 – means that those instruments were, implicitly, better evaluated – but there were costs. Direct controls do not eliminate "common property" externalities. These tools can help the recovery of stocks but they do not exclude competition and inter-temporal rationality is not imposed to the agents. Inefficiency is maintained and overcapacity and overexploitation persists.

Recognising the fisheries sector situation and the management problem, the EU went on a great effort of CFP reforming. The Reform of 2003 (Coelho, 2002) pretended to mark a new beginning for the CFP. The main changes implicated a long-term approach in fisheries management, a simpler policy of fleet capacity putting on the Member states the responsibility of reduction of the fishing effort and of adapting it to the existing resources, a better application and enforcement of common rules and

stakeholders' involvement in the CFP – but some problems subsisted. Those inefficiencies went on being the centre of the discussions when a new Reform was implemented in 2013. In the core, they had to do with the persistence of conflicts between objectives. One of the most important is the problem of the contradiction between decreasing of fishing effort and the need of maintenance of the jobs and of some socio-economic balance in the coastal areas. The maintenance of decent standards of living for fishermen would demand increases or, at least, maintenance of the captures. Such seems to be contradictory with the urgent need of stock recovery.

The so-called "Quota Hopping" problem is a very good example of preoccupations that, in the end, confronts us with the purposes of the Relative Stability principle. "Quota-hopping", usually understood as the flagging of fishing vessels in order to fish against the catch quotas of another country, is a by-product of European Common Fisheries Policy. By purchasing vessels and quotas in different countries, some fisheries enterprises act like perfect multinational firms capturing fishing stocks that were supposed to belong to national fishing communities. The problem is that the "relative stability" of fixed formula of quotas distribution between member-states reflects the fact that European fishermen representation is still linked to national and local communities. However, this territorial logic is in perfect contradiction with the development conditions of a free market (as supported in the Treaty). In fact, free movement of capital and "Free Establishment" principle rest under a different logic. Therefore, CFP is put under conflicting dimensions: Equity and Efficiency, Relative Stability and Free Establishment (Morin, 2000; Coelho et al., 2009). The UK's situation, in the end of the nineties, gives a "good" example of "quota hopping". Although not restricted to this member state, it was the case of UK's fleet that had attracted the most foreign investment, especially from Spain and Netherlands, and gave the phenomenon visibility for discussion. In late 90s, something like 25% of British quotas were held by foreign-owned quota-hopping vessels. This situation represented an important critic of the stakeholders to the CFP rules. They attacked the way the quota system was being circumvented (Coelho et al. 2007b; Hatcher et al., 2002).

"Quota-hopping" analysis may give important lessons for CFP reform discussion. First lesson has a special interest for several Social Sciences, from Sociology to Politics, from Economics to History. In fact, this is a good field to investigate the dichotomy between a national oriented policy and the process of de-territorialisation arising from single market construction: One can highlight the way quota hopping emerges under the incompatibilities between the trans-nationalization process promoted through the "Europeanization" of EU policies and the territorial logic claimed by the national governments. In this context, an important issue is revealed that, perhaps, surmounts the CFP, itself. That is the pure question of democracy: how can economic powers, in the process of market development, pass over the political decisions made by the democratic, elected institutions? And, in this case, blur the objective of cohesion that is implicit in the supranational management (Lequesne, 2000).

In such a policy, both governments and non-governmental agents no longer have the monopoly over the political agenda. CFP is defined through permanent interactions and negotiations. The non-territorial logic of EU governance challenges the social order inherited from European welfare states. These transnational actors, using EU rules, move permanently in the search of more favorable conditions and profits. This mobility of capital encourages more competition in the European fisheries sector, and, at the same time, raises more social uncertainty in the Member states. Economic and social actors in the EU are no longer subject to one political authority that is able to guard the values of justice and equity. It seems that there are some actors playing "the rules of the EU game", yet, also surmounting the power of elected governments. The dynamics towards trans-nationalisation encourages a diffusion of power and blurs the exercise of political democratic elected administration (Coelho et al., 2009; Lequesne, 2000; Inamoto, 2003).

5. RIGHTS BASED MANAGEMENT

Quota-hopping analysis highlights another important subject for the future of Common Fisheries Policy: the issue of Rights Based Management. The origins of modern Fisheries Economics can be traced back in the 50s with the papers of Gordon (1954), Scott (1955) and Schaefer (1957). In his seminal paper "The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery", Gordon argued that, within a situation of open access and competition, the market would not lead to the most efficient solution in resource use. The common property nature of fish resources and the presence of externalities in the capture process implied that, in an unregulated fishery, the result would be the expansion of the industry to a point of economic, even biological, overfishing (Clark 1985; Conrad, 1999; Munro & Scott, 1985).

All fisheries management systems in the world have introduced some form of use/access rights to face the problems derived from the "common property" nature of fisheries (Coelho & Lopes, 1999; MRAG et al., 2007)). The idea of creating markets for fishing rights has received considerable attention by the founding fathers of Law and Economics and Fisheries Economics such as Coase, Scott and Christy. The idea is to create a market of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and confide in the self-regulation of such a system to conduct the fisheries to the economic efficiency and to promote inter-temporal sustainable use of resources. There are several possibilities of doing this. In general, we first need to determine the TAC that guaranties the sustainable use of fish stock and then we can divide this total amount into several unit quotas that are distributed to the fishing enterprises. A market for quotas can be created with those transferable "permits". The objective is that, after some time, the property rights will be driven to the most efficient agents, those that can allocate the resources in a perspective of optimal sustainable use along the time. Because they are the "real owners" they will internalize the effects of externalities.

Rights Based Management schemes have already been experimented in some specific fisheries and localizations. These experiences have a lot of teaching results about

good practices of sustainable fisheries management and also about the limitations/ risks of these tools. These conclusions are fundamental to explore the feasibility of these tools as instruments of conservation in the CFP (MRAG et al., 2007; Coelho, 2010; Coelho et al., 2011).

These economic methods have a special advantage in the sense that they introduce mechanisms that should conduct the fisheries to the efficiency, eliminating the less efficient producers and changing, effectively, the agents' behavior. ITQs are usually considered the best regulation choice on efficiency grounds. Granting the fisherman an individual quota may reduce the incentives to race for fish. One can expect:

- Benefits at the capacity level and effort rationalization,
- Reduced fleet size and optimal vessel configuration,
- Flexible and extended fishing seasons,
- Higher catch-per-unit of effort.

Although this may enhance the quality of landings and improve markets and safety – operations by avoiding the landings glut, by reducing storage costs and so on – there are also plenty problems. Professor Copes, in the mid 80s, when the first experiences with ITQs were evaluated, referred the problems of property concentration and the consequent problem of unemployment (Copes, 1986). After a period of change of quotas in the market, the problem of monopolization of the sector is well documented in several fishing-cases analysis. The number of owners tends to decline in time and it might foster widening income disparities and unemployment. The abandonment of the less efficient producers creates many difficulties in some coastal areas where the mostly dependent on fisheries populations live. Given the poor capacity of inter-professional mobility of many fishermen, the introduction of these methods accelerates the social crisis in those depressed maritime worlds and put in danger some important cultures and ways of living.

We can also add some other important issues. One relates with the mechanism design of this kind of methods. For example: How can we make the initial division and distribution of quotas? In a system of "Grandfathering"? Auctions? Should the initial

distribution take account of "historic catches" from the companies? What about those companies that, in a certain moment, did not enter a certain fisheries, but has now a real interest in the business? For those who were in the initial distribution, the quotas seem like a "windfall gain".

In such a scheme, owners of initial quotas will sell at a price representing the full present value of the stream of rents generated, that is, the ones wishing to enter will have to pay, in advance, the full value of resource rents – we're confronted with a "transitional gains trap". According to Coase, these are not "the real problem", because what is important is the result; something like the "Invisible Hand" will drive the system to the best equilibrium solution (Coase, 1960). What about in the short term? What are the social and political reactions to these uncomfortable situations?

In addition, there are problems of monitoring. Usually, economists prefer these methods because they introduce some kind of self-regulation. In fact, the sense of ownership should give the property-rights users, the real perception that the results of their actions will affect the net economic benefits that derive from the resource utilization. They should manage the resources in a sustainable way, but the reality shows that without a government control policy, a substantial amount of problems subsist, including data fouling and quota busting, discarding, more intensive utilization of best fishing grounds, etc.

Moreover, there are challenges about revenue distribution. The question of equity versus efficiency is still a strong issue for debate. The economic theory proves the equivalence, in terms of efficiency, between the pigouvian tax and a scheme of ITQs, but the distribution gains between agents is still different. In the first case (pigouvian tax), the rents are optimized by the Regulation Agency and, in the second (ITQs), rents and welfare gains are distributed between the private agents. Besides this theoretical discussion, the practical, fundamental question persists: Rights based management can improve the efficiency in fisheries management, but who will ultimately receive the gains of sustainable use of resources? What about the distribution of rents? Welfare gains: who are the winners and the losers?

6. FINAL REMARKS

Moving again in the CFP reform direction: as we said, the basic problems subsist. In the core heart of the system failure one can find the persistence of conflicts between objectives: The need of urgent stock recovery and economic efficiency in the long term and the need of some social equilibrium in the sector in the short run. This means that the fundamental issue to discuss is the Relative Stability principle. This principle, which guided the allocation of fishing possibilities to the member states, can be seen as an exemption from the internal market that is embedded in the CFP. The relatively fixed formula of division of quotas between member states stresses the necessity of considering the social objectives of the CFP. The Stability Principle creates some kind of territorialisation of fisheries policy not permitting trade of quotas between member states and this is a special method to sustain some social balance in the coastal areas. This stability in fisheries operations is the possible antidote to generalized "social crisis". Of course, the introduction of a liberal system of tradable fishing permits is going to create many difficulties in the maintenance of the Stability Principle, even if the Commission does not make such a reference.

There are signals that the agents circumvented the principle of territorial definition of rights: "quota-hopping" gives an interesting "warning". Perhaps, by setting up a transparent system for transfers of fishing rights, member states could more easily regulate and monitor such trade in use rights. We might think that most inefficiencies are resulting from the previous regime of management and expect a clearly reduction in transaction costs in a free regime of trade. Of course, that would result in more economic efficiency. However, the issue of introducing a more liberal property rights trade system will have to confront the distributional effects of such a *coasian* proposal. In this sense, we are still confronted with the fundamental question: a reform to whom? What will be the social impacts for the coastal zones? This is a fundamental question to be posed today. Especially when the Commission promotes the idea of an integrated Maritime

Policy of which one fundamental axis is the promotion of sustainable development in the coastal areas.

With RBM schemes, reducing the fishing effort without subsidies for vessels retirement is, clearly, a result that the Commission can see with good expectations. But to explain this to the agents is very difficult and probably creates a huge political reaction. It seems that this cannot be put to stakeholders' discussion in a so "cruel" manner as made by the Commission – thus, some political sensibility is needed. Also, it seems that the role attributed to the POs (Producers Organizations) in the regularization of markets of production and trade of fisheries products will be clearly reduced in such a liberal proposal. The evaluation of several experiences of RBM, within and out of the EU, is fundamental to this debate – more investigation is necessary.

Finally, an important route for further investigation relates to the perception of the stakeholders about these fundamental changes, with a special attention to the Portuguese case. Some basic results of previous studies stress the problem of the lack of differentiation in the application of RBM schemes to different segments of European fisheries (Cá, 2018; Coelho et al, 2015). In the case of Portugal, several ecologist organizations (Sciaena and LPN, for example) put the specific problem of *artisanal* fisheries. These costal fisheries have no important effects on unsustainable fishing and the introduction of such a scheme of ITQs could easily put the segment in a situation of monopolization. A real problem of large unemployment is expected, augmented by the "dissolution" of important POs that are active actually. Fishermen and vessel owners' organizations, NGOs and fisheries experts from public administration seem to sustain these preoccupations.

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